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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
Appellant Incorporates the Points
Arguments Set Forth in his Initial Brief

and

Appellant incorporates herein all the Points and arguments set forth in his Initial
Brief as if the same were fully set forth herein.
POINT II
This Court should Create a Duty of Divorced
Parents with Minor Children to be Familiar
with and Obey the Latest Version of the
Visitation Statutes

Appellee asserts that the trial court properly or correctly found that she did not
knowingly and willfully violate a court order. Appellee claims that the court was correct in
this ruling based on at least two factors:
1.

That "Appellee did not know that subsequent changes in the law changed
her rights and obligations under the existing visitation order." Appellee goes
on to claim that nothing in the order "informed her that such changes could
happen without returning to court, no law states that changes in the visitation
statute apply to existing court orders, and no case law addressed the issue
of whether or not a statutory change requires a petition for modification or if
the statute invisibly and quietly modifies substantive provisions of existing
orders without the knowledge of either party."
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2.

That "Appellee did not know that the visitation statute had been changed to
grant noncustodial parents and additional day and a half of visitation for
President's Day in even-numbered years."

This is precisely the point and one of the mam bases for this appeal. The great majority
of divorce decrees dealing with visitation require, at a minimum, compliance with Utah
Code Ann. § 30-3-35. This is the case in the present matter. By so doing, the decrees
incuicate the statute as part of the order. Appellee's position wouid freeze the visitation
in time at the point the decree was entered and require a petition to modify the decree
every time there was a statutory alteration. This would be an untenable position and, as
set forth below, place and untenable burden on the parties.
In the present case, the law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee,
have the parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for
parent-time at the time he is to be picked up . . . ."); see also Charlseworth v. State of
California, 793 P.2d 411, 414-15 (Utah App. 1990) (Orme, J., dissenting) ("[the custodial
parer^has-tbe~legaT4utyJa make the-ctuldren- available ^unreasonable visitation"}^
Additionally, the decree of divorce between the parties calls for visitation to be consistent
with Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 (2004) (See Addendum II, attached hereto). This statute
calls for visitation for Washington and Lincoln Day "beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7 p.m

"

This statute was amended or changed by the legislature in 2001 to add additional
time to this holiday. The visitation statutes have been amended frequently. In fact, Utah
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Code Ann. § 30-3-35 was enacted in 1993. It was thereafter amended in 1997,2000,2001
and 2003. Other visitation statutes have been similarly amended.1 The position advocated
by Appellee would relieve any parent from the operation of the amendments to the statute.
In fact, a party wanting the amended visitation would need to bring a petition to modify in
order to inculcate in the decree the new provisions of the statute. Thus, with each
amendment would come tens of thousands of petitions to modify placing an overwhelming
burden on the parties and the courts. Certainly this is not a good poiicy and couid not have
been the intention of the legislature and would certainly not be the holding of this Court.
Appellee further argues that Appellant is asking the question of "what should the law
be" and not "did the trial court correctly apply the law." In so doing, Appellee argues that
even if this Court were to change the law, or more precisely from Appellant's position,
clarify the law, that Appellee could not be held in contempt under the ex post facto
doctrine. Assuming for argument sake that Appellee is correct, the problem and question
still linger. Should a parent, especially the custodial parent, be required to know and follow
the law regarding visitation? There is an old adage in the law that "ignorantia juris non
excusatr~igaofar"ice-otthe-law is naexcuse^orvas sometimes^e^xpressed^%norafttia-legis
neminem excusat," ignorance of the law excuses no one. State v. Salt Lake City, 99 P.
255,261 (Utah 1908) (Straup, J. concurring). While most commentators have claimed that
this maxim is often misapplied since it is not possible for any one person to know all the
law, Justice Campbell of the Michigan Supreme Court, Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191, 15
Am. Rep. 162) observed: "But the maxim referred to in regard to a knowledge of the law

1

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-34 and 30-3-35.5.
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is misapplied. No man can avoid a liability, as a general thing, because he is ignorant of
the law. This is an essential rule of society. . . ." This is precisely the point of the appeal
in this regard. Should a custodial parent be able to avoid liability for denied visitation by
claiming ignorance of the most recent amendments to the visitation statute?

While

Appellee may argue that it is not reasonable for a custodial parent to keep up on the
changes of the visitation statute, it is certainly more than reasonable to assert that a
custodial parent can be heid iiabie for not knowing such changes and governing himself
or herself accordingly.
These reasons, as well as the arguments set forth by Appellee, speak to the need
to have a policy requiring parents in divorce situations with minor children to become and
remain aware of the latest and most recent versions of the visitation statutes.
POINT 111
The Duty to Know and Obey the Visitation
Statute Should Lie with the Custodial Parent
Appellee questions as to which parent would be charged with the duty of having to
know the changes to the visitation statute. Obviously, it would be important for both
parents to know any changes to the statute. However, this question is rather easily
answered. The law requires that the custodial parent, in this case Appellee, have the
parties' minor child ready for pick up at the beginning of a visitation period. See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-33(5) (2004) ("the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time
at the time he is to be picked up . . . ."). As a result, the duty would lie with the custodial
parent to know any changes to the statute and to have the child ready for pick up as
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mandated by statute. If the child is not made available for pick up as required by the
statute, all other considerations become academic.
Appellee claims that Appellant did not even request additional time. The reality is
that he is entitled to additional time pursuant to statute. He had to go to great lengths to
get that time including the filing of a motion for order to show cause and even appearing
at the hearing before Appellee consented and allowed him to have extra time to make up
for the missed time.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court express a
duty of divorced parents with minor children subject to visitation to know and comply with
the most current and governing version of the visitation statute. Appellant further requests
that this Court overturn the trial court's ruling that Appellee could not be held in contempt
and award him his costs and attorney fees and remand for any appropriate and necessary
proceedings. Oral argument requested.
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